Interplays between international and domestic legal spheres have attracted increased attention in investor-State dispute settlement. From the treaty ratification process to award execution, constitutional norms play recurring roles before, during and after investment arbitrations. This contribution deals with the manner in which parties to such disputes can rely upon constitutional law or, more broadly speaking, domestic law. Notably, major hurdles to the application of domestic law in transnational fora have not necessarily constrained the arbitral profile of constitutional principles. This is because they may gain prominence through informal paths. Rather than directly
investment arbitrations beyond the consideration of 'facts' . The application of international law does not exclude per se the additional application of municipal laws; rather, international law may renvoi to these domestic counterparts.4 One instance wherein international adjudicative bodies have long resorted to domestic constitutional legal thresholds concerns the issue of the claimant's (i.e., the investor's) nationality.5 Yet while such analysis will naturally involve the constitution of the investor's home State, more often it is the laws of the host State that preoccupy investment tribunals. Even the most foundational principles of such constitutions can require a tribunal to compare international and domestic norms.
Against this background, some well-known arbitrations have implied constitutional issues from within the wider scope of fundamental rights,6 which include not only human rights but also more general public policy-related rights, as well as basic legal values on which host States rely when contracting with investors.7 Moreover, variations between host State constitutions prevent any exhaustive listing of fundamental rights. These principles may therefore range from social justice and the rule of law, to transparency, accountability and local communities' consultation rights concerning resource exploitation.
Furthermore, when some fundamental rights are found in constitutional law but not within treaties or customary law applicable to a dispute, constitutional law may offer a means of filling gaps in international law.8 The field of investment arbitration has shed some light on this issue, particularly with reference to the applicable law provisions of the ICSID Convention.9 (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable." Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), adopted 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159, Art. 42(1). An ad hoc ICSID Annulment Committee interpreted this provision as authorizing a tribunal "to apply rules of international law only to fill up lacunae in the applicable domestic law and to ensure precedence to international law norms" when in conflict with domestic law. Amco Asia v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment, 16 May 1986, para. 20. However, a more lucid statement of the relationship between these two spheres would come from the tribunal in the resubmitted version of the same case. This latter tribunal noted that Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention follows the general premise that "international law is fully applicable and to classify its role as 'only' 'supplemental and corrective' seems a distinction without a difference." Amco Asia v. Indonesia Such recourse by investment tribunals may be particularly helpful in, for example, determining whether the fair and equitable treatment standard has been breached by the denial of constitutional due process. In this light, we can see discretionary opportunities for arbitrators to intermingle two legal spheres that are often thought of as distinct.
Evolution of Overlaps in an Arbitral Context
We may note that links between international and domestic spheres can play a role in rooting arbitral awards in what the WTO Appellate Body in the ECHormones case described in memorably stark terms: "the real world where people live, work and die."10 The following year, an ad hoc tribunal in the Himpurna California Energy case echoed this sentiment in an investment context. incorporated by reference into investment treaties, such as the recently signed investment treaty between Canada and China, which states that host State laws on access to information will trump a tribunal's confidentiality orders to the extent they conflict.31
Constitutional Influences in Investor-State Claims and Defenses
In terms of tribunals' analysis and consideration of domestic constitutions during the course of arbitrations, we can draw attention to two broad paths. The first concerns informal comity toward constitutional principles and idiosyncrasies that may lie at the heart of an investment dispute. The second is the extent to which a host State may formally rely upon constitutional guarantees to its people as a defense to a claim, particularly in the context of a domestic crisis.
2.2.1
Informal Deference to Constitutional Expertise A general theme that emerges with respect to comity is tribunals' unwillingness or reluctance to 'second-guess' domestic courts' interpretations of their own constitutional safeguards and domestic legal complexities.32 The extent to which tribunals have regarded host State constitutions should not be viewed as a measure of the legal force of constitutional provisions against international law. Rather, we may see deference to national interpretations of principles enshrined in both domestic law and international law. Foremost among these principles is that of fair and equitable treatment. This is a fundamental principle of most domestic laws and the basis for a pervasive claim in investment dispute settlement.
It is possible for a treaty to refer directly to constitutional norms, as is the case in the CARICOM-Cuba investment treaty. For the purposes of our review, however, it may suffice to narrow the focus toward those claims that specifically allege a denial of justice. Foreign investor claims that question the legal effectiveness of host State administrative procedures may informally trigger issues of comity. This is due to a true distinction between the aforementioned institutions and investment tribunals. Such tribunals are not constituted to serve as appellate courts reviewing domestic judicial decisions, much less very fine points of national law. To that extent, Jan Paulsson has submitted that even "gross or notorious injustice … is not a denial of justice merely because the conclusion appears to be demonstrably wrong in substance; it must impel the adjudicator to conclude that it could not have been reached by an impartial judicial body worthy of that name."41
Denial of justice allegations do not direct arbitrators to gauge the substantive accuracy of a State's application of its own laws. We must therefore consider fair and equitable treatment in this regard as a principle related to procedural fairness.42 With this in mind, we may turn to some recent NAFTA arbitrations that have raised related and complex constitutional issues. We can now more concretely appreciate how a tribunal-by emphasizing the NAFTA Chapter 11 is a notable prism through which we can view international and domestic legal interplay. One reason for this is that the basic constitutional tensions at play in federalist States are particularly visible in investment dispute settlement. NAFTA's States Parties vest substantial constitutional authority in sub-federal sovereigns, governing economic and environmental matters alike. In Canada, for example, the federal government in 2010 settled a Chapter 11 claim brought by US investor AbitibiBowater, arising from an expropriation by the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. Canada's constitution, however, does not include any mechanism whereby Ottawa can recoup its CAD procedural character of its FET analysis-may therefore draw inspiration from domestic interpretations of this principle. For example, the tribunal in the Glamis Gold case dealt with a US agency's "lengthy, reasoned legal opinion" of constitutional law.43 The namesake Canadian corporation in this case was engaged in the exploration and extraction of precious metals throughout the continent. In 1994, Glamis Gold acquired mining rights for a proposed open-pit gold mine on US federal lands, in the California desert lands known as Imperial Valley. Given the potential ecological damages associated with the firm's proposed mining practices, permission to commence exploration hinged on a thorough environmental review. This review considered, inter alia, the rights of indigenous populations in the area. In 2001, after years of study, the relevant federal agency formally denied the Glamis Gold project.
This rejection was based in large part on an apparent conflict between the longstanding US mining statute liberalizing mining rights in the American West, and the religious freedoms guaranteed under the State's federal constitution.44 Noting that a local tribe's religion required it to worship in a pathway traversing the proposed mining area-and analogizing US Supreme Court precedents addressing other natural resource agencies-the executive order found that the federal government was bound to "preserv[e] the physical integrity of the sites unless such a choice [was] impracticable, forbidden by law, or clearly inconsistent with essential agency functions."45 However, following a change in presidential administrations the same year, this opinion was reversed and the Imperial Valley Project was approved. In response to this federal turnaround, California adopted an emergency regulation implementing onerous remediation requirements designed to preserve lands near tribal sacred sites. This example of dual regulatory sovereignty results from a constitutionally enshrined federalism that surfaces somewhat frequently in NAFTA Chapter 11 claims,46 which are what Glamis Gold brought The Grand River case was a subsequent NAFTA dispute with facts even more intertwined with domestic federalism issues and informal issues of 'secondguessing' domestic institutions.51 In this case, the investor, a Canadian cigarette distributor, arranged a business strategy that would mitigate its financial obligations under the contemporary tobacco laws in many US states. Such obligations required tobacco distributors to place large sums into escrow accounts in order to settle claims related to the damaging health effects of cigarettes.
However, Grand River attempted to circumvent these state requirements by distributing its product primarily through the quasi-sovereign 'Indian territories' occupied by federally recognized tribes. The major question for the tribunal in the eventual NAFTA case, therefore, was whether US constitutional law and federalism granted US states the regulatory authority to impose their escrow laws on commerce in tribal reservations within a state's territory.52
Striking a deferential note similar to Glamis Gold, the tribunal stated that "US federal Indian law is a complex and not altogether consistent mixture of constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and judicial decisions by the US Supreme Court …"53 Finding that "US domestic law is currently far from conclusive about the question raised here of the extent of permissible state regulation," the Grand River tribunal cautiously noted that " [d] etermining the contents of that law … often calls for necessarily uncertain predictions of how future courts will apply past decisions involving different [state regulations]."54 From this context, the tribunal forcefully returned to the themes of the Glamis Gold tribunal's treatment of claims based on NAFTA Article 1105 fair and equitable treatment, stating that it "is loath to purport to address … delicate and complex questions of US constitutional [law] ."55 Dismissing Grand River's claims in full, the tribunal asserted its reluctance to address delicate matters of federal law, finding instead that such "issues of national law belong in national courts, not in an international tribunal."56 In other This comity toward executive opinions on 'complex' questions of constitutional law is particularly noteworthy because claimant Grand River argued that US authorities had violated one of the State's international human rights obligations: the duty to consult with indigenous peoples prior to making important regulatory decisions affecting their interests.57 As this legal duty arguably formed part of the claimant's reasonable expectations at the time of contracting, the Grand River tribunal essentially deferred to domestic treatment of federalism questions in lieu of its own competence to counterbalance legitimate investor expectations.58
On this point, we may return to our earlier discussion of the role of constitutional law in instances where an international treaty does not address relevant fundamental rights. Under nafta, a tribunal "shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law."59 This mandate does not refer expressly to constitutional or any State law, and yet we have seen nafta tribunals in Glamis Gold and Grand River find cause to show informal deference to domestic law. Concerning the legal interests of local populations that are intertwined in these cases, one may begin to discern a certain tendency in investor-State arbitration to recognize a rather broad margin for governments to make their own choices in ensuring the respect of constitutional norms within their jurisdictions. 
Formal Application of Constitutional Obligations
The right of compensation in case of expropriation, like the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment, is a fundamental principle common to a majority of domestic legal systems, and many States codify this right at the constitutional level (including Croatia, Denmark, Germany and Italy).61 US jurisprudence has explained that State's constitutional permission of compensated takings on the basis of States' implicit police powers: exercises of a government's sovereign right to protect its people's lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare, at a level paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.62 In more recent decades, the us Supreme Court extended this reasoning to contracts between individuals and the entities of the states.63
Like the constitutional courts of these domestic legal systems, those of transnational jurisdiction broadly support the principle that States may terminate or otherwise modify contracts with private parties in the event of superseding public interests. This authority is indeed so uncontroversial that it is generally read as an implied exception to investment treaty umbrella clauses. 64 However, despite overlaps between domestic and international legal principles in this context, direct reference to constitutional law as a host State defense against foreign investors' claims has proven problematic in practice. This is because it is a formal path to applying domestic law. As such, it may be examined in contrast with the informal paths we have just seen in the context of fair and equitable treatment claims.
For example, if proof of a taking is established in an investment arbitration, constitutional law may inform the fact of whether sufficient justification exists to excuse the host State from any required and outstanding compensation. However, domestic constitutions vary widely on this point and may not provide substantive clarity to the tribunal concerning a government's conformity or non-conformity with its own laws defining states of emergency. For example, France's 1958 constitution vests broad discretion and powers in the President when "the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted."65 The US not only similarly lacks any clear constitutional discussion of economic emergencies, but also lacks any constitutional provision on emergency authorities beyond the rudimentary suspension of habeas corpus "when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. "66 In contrast, investment tribunals have incrementally contributed to a more static norm of emergency powers, notably involving defenses based on the human rights elements of State constitutions. For example, in several disputes arising from its financial crisis, Argentina has explicitly referred to resulting threats to its 'constitutional order' , in both the societal and legal senses of the term. 67 The intriguing point here is the manner in which conflicts with human rights obligations appear to arise.
In some instances, Argentina has argued that it took measures in response to its financial crisis that were necessary to uphold the basic rights and liberties of the Argentine public, and has at times cited the supremacy of human rights treaty obligations within its Constitution. 68 The first investment tribunal to render an award in such a dispute was the CMS case, which not only rejected Argentina's human rights defense, but deemed that the human rights and investor obligations in question were not in conflict, and therefore led to no issues of constitutional supremacy.69 Meanwhile, the tribunal in the Sempra case simply concluded on the same facts that no danger of societal collapse existed to have even necessitated the suspension of liberties.70 In contrast, an ICSID tribunal's award in the Continental Casualty case reached opposite conclusions on both the effectiveness of Argentina's emergency defense and the preeminence of its human rights obligations.71 Of particular note to our discussion of constitutional interplay is the tribunal's remark that Argentina's 878 protection of fundamental liberties was a proactive step that removed the necessity of later suspending such liberties to enforce social order.72
The resulting deference that the Continental Casualty tribunal granted to Argentina's crisis management decisions stands in stark contrast to the limited margin of appreciation that had been granted to Argentina under the same circumstances by the tribunal in the Siemens case.73 Indeed, that tribunal had rejected as unformed Argentina's argument that the property rights claimed by Siemens would have forced Argentina to violate its constitutionally preeminent international human rights treaty obligations.74
In a more recent case arising from the Argentine financial crisis, the tribunal in SAUR International acknowledged fundamental human rights, and in particular the right to water, as safeguarded by both the Argentine constitution and general principles of international law.75 However, the tribunal held that this regulatory concern must be combined with investors' treaty rights to compensation for property.76
2.3
Constitutional Interplay in Post-Award Procedures Recognition, enforcement and execution refer to phases between the issuance of an ICSID investment arbitration award and the successful claimant's collection of its due.77 These are stages during which a losing host State may have previously unavailable opportunities to insert its constitutional principles into the gears of ICSID's relatively automated dispute closure mechanism. For example, concerning the recognition of the award, Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention allows that "[a] Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state."78 In the same sense, Article 54(2) requires that a party seeking recognition and enforcement of an ICSID award in the territory of a Contracting State must provide a certified copy of the award to the competent court or other authority designated by the State.79 These two sub-sections, taken in tandem, suggest that a successful claimant faces distinct tasks depending on which sovereign it is dealing with. Argentina, for example, has interpreted this Article as requiring claimants to first obtain enforcement of ICSID awards against it in Argentine courts. In practice, this has not led to commonplace problems with execution.89 However, the few outliers have resulted in very convoluted execution proceedings. In the primary example of the Benvenuti case,90 the claimant applied to the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris to enforce its ICSID award. The court obliged, but noted that the order could not be executed against Republic of Congo assets in French territory without additional authorization, since such constitutional sovereign immunity might shield those assets. The investor appealed this decision to the Cour d'appel de Paris, which overturned the caveat to execution on the basis that it violated the ICSID Convention's streamlined enforcement procedure. According to the Court, the lower body had exceeded its competence: while it had been requested to enforce the award, it had made an unnecessary finding concerning the award's execution. 91 While an investor may attempt to persuade the prospective investment's host State, at the time of contracting, to waive sovereign immunity, it is unlikely that any State would easily relinquish its constitutional protections against Yet if as some commentators have noted-the primary motivation for the application of comparative constitutional law is the prevention of arbitral law-making,99 it may be worth examining the extent to which investment tribunals have assimilated the traditional constitutive functions of legislatures. Some such blurring can be seen in democratic constitutional organs' increasing participation in areas of transnational concern, such as military operations and international trade.100 More frequently, however, it is the reverse evolution (i.e., international dispute settlement practices progressing to more closely resemble their domestic counterparts) that has attracted scholarly attention.101
In the context of this blurring, investment arbitration may be more constructively understood in relation to administrative or constitutional judicial review than to private international procedures such as commercial arbitration.102 Like international public dispute settlement mechanisms at the WTO, CJEU and ECtHR, investment tribunals may offer a form of constitutional litigation: a judicial review of government conduct towards a private party.103 By contrast, such standards of good governance are not prone to factor into the work of commercial arbitration tribunals. 104 In this view of State-investor obligations as functionally similar to State-individual constitutional guarantees, the utility of consulting comparative constitutional law may become more readily apparent. 105 The extent to which tribunals rely upon constitutional law may be apparent in the informal context of transnational public policy. Arbitrators may choose to consider a form of 'global constitutional law' or international public order to give weight to certain sovereign norms in the context of international arbitration.106 Yet perhaps the primary parallel between the notion of investment law as a "new form of global public law"107 and the constitutional litigation of domestic courts is the standing of non-State actors to initiate proceedings.108 Individual standing before international courts and tribunals has been a major feature of dispute settlement bodies addressing human rights at the regional level, such as the ECtHR. Investment treaties' grant of the same traditionally domestic procedural right to business actors can be viewed within a broader trend of individual empowerment in international dispute settlement. An example in a criminal context is that of the International Criminal Court, which grants participatory rights to individual victims during the course of a trial.109 This trend can also be seen in an environmental context, where legal instruments such as the Aarhus Convention permit individual persons and However, critical questions have been raised as to the coherence of the constitutional analogy in international investment law. Primary among these involve the lack or limitation of judicial review of investment awards, implying that such arbitrations may not maintain the same degree of constitutional accountability as do domestic proceedings.116 In response, some have praised the WTO Appellate Body as a model of constitutionalized judicial review in this regard.117 While importing this model into an investment regime such as ICSID might pose a danger of 'coherence in the wrong direction' ,118 the relative lack of uniformity in investment jurisprudence may appear to some observers as a deficit in the constitutionalization of arbitral practices. 119 Yet if uniformity is a sign of constitutionalized law, legitimacy arguably remains its primary motive.120 Just as constitutional norms such as fair and equitable treatment may affirm the central tenets of a legal system,121 so too have some investment tribunals considered that they, "as a matter of international constitutional law [have] an independent duty to apply imperative principles of law or jus cogens,"122 regardless of a traditional arbitral reliance on parties' specifications of applicable law.
Despite frequent mention to the contrary,123 the matrix of State obligations in international investment disputes (e.g., duties to both investors and public interests) need not necessarily be viewed in perpetual inconsistency. As in human rights analysis, investment law may utilize analogous methods of interpretation to prevent conflicts with other obligations at international law or domestic constitutional law.124 For the investment tribunal, the emergent trend toward harmonization between these interests may be a matter of viewing the relevant rules from a vantage of interpretation, rather than one of conflict. 125 In other words, the issue of violating one duty by adhering to another need not be viewed as a formal conflict of norms. The impossibility of simultaneously obeying multiple obligations does not mean that those obligations are per se in conflict with one another; rather, some commentators have advocated that these alleged conflicts of principles be viewed instead as conflicts of factual results. 126 In this regard, soft law may serve a role in permitting a balance of compatibility between obligations of private and public concern.127 It can be argued that some instruments constituted under the OECD and other institutionsaddressed not only to host States but also to foreign investors-provide a dispute-preventive framework of norms influencing public and private actors operating in public services sectors.128 Moreover, such a framework may conform to international law as well as constitutional provisions common to a great number of States.129 Such developments may well serve as landmarks on the path toward more coherent constitutionalization in investment law or other public-private international regimes. This path may also lead to greater emphasis on balance and mutual supportiveness in the obligations of States and the rule-based interpretations of tribunals.130 Whether such harmonization in international investment arbitration will reduce any perceptions of conflict between tribunals and traditional domestic constitutional instruments, however, remains a viable question.
Conclusion
As the application of domestic law in international dispute settlement is an exercise in overcoming hurdles-and as investment arbitration today offers an evolving but inherently fragmented body of precedents-it should not surprise that different tribunals have thus exhibited varying degrees of comity toward States' administrative and judicial procedures. The informal paths that we have traced between constitutional law and investment arbitration rely upon such comity. It entails tribunals' reluctance to probe alleged denials of justice when host State procedures do not appear to contradict principles of due process and the rule of law. Moreover, it may compel those tribunals' deference to domestic interpretations of constitutional complexities. In practice, these paths have more effectively assimilated constitutional law than have more formal approaches, such as we have seen in host State defenses based on emergency powers. Yet these faint but clearing paths between the two legal spheres do not tell the end of the story. There may be marked trails as well, such as our earlier mention of investment treaties incorporating host State norms by reference. Still another portal may be found in the premise of comparative constitutional analysis. This is not a merely theoretical model or a one-sided push to 'domesticate' investor-State dispute settlement through traditional constitutional constraints. It acknowledges that the standards and tests embraced by tribunals are likely to influence both the future conduct of States and the decisions of other tribunals. Moreover, the trend toward viewing investor-State arbitration as part of a global governance structure naturally encourages resort to principles of comparative constitutional law, particularly when assessing the concept of fair and equitable treatment.
In this sense, the content of fair and equitable treatment standards is poised to evolve further in the coming years of investment arbitration. Despite the general supremacy of international law, tribunals called upon to decide
